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CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS:  ACCOUNTING FOR 
CHANGED FACTUAL CONDITIONS UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Sean G. Williamson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The world is subject to continuous change.  Ideas and practices, 
which were once revolutionary, become outmoded and archaic as so-
ciety responds to new events, developments, and knowledge.  This 
change places great stress on the American constitutional order and 
its institutions.  To encourage stability and the rule of law, constitu-
tional decisions made by courts are often characterized as perma-
nent.  However, that treatment of the results of constitutional litiga-
tion produces tension because the factual conditions on which such 
results are based may fade away as time passes. 
The tension between an ever-changing world and a stable consti-
tutional order is particularly prevalent when a court assesses a classifi-
cation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1  In this situation, a court must evaluate the facts estab-
lishing the government’s asserted interest and the facts demonstrat-
ing that the classification furthers the government’s interest.2 
Here, a question arises:  Should the court examine only those fac-
tual conditions that existed at the time of the classification’s creation, 
or should its analysis be informed by the changed factual conditions 
that may exist at the time of the constitutional challenge?  Proper 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause must be conducted in 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 2 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that, under strict scrutiny, “clas-
sifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling gov-
ernmental interests”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating that, under ra-
tional basis review, “the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification 
rationally further a legitimate state interest”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) 
(stating that, under intermediate scrutiny, “classifications . . . must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives”). 
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light of the factual conditions that exist at the time of the constitu-
tional challenge, rather than looking back to the classification’s crea-
tion.  This Comment refers to that assessment of the present factual 
conditions as “contemporary contextual analysis.” 
When reviewing equal protection challenges under strict scrutiny, 
the United States Supreme Court uses contemporary contextual anal-
ysis consistently.3  However, contemporary contextual analysis is not 
confined to the most exacting form of review.  Each level of scrutiny 
requires that a classification be connected to its context, though the 
strength of that connection may vary. 
But lower courts have questioned whether contemporary contex-
tual analysis is appropriate at the least-probing level of scrutiny—
rational basis review.4  Those courts argue that contemporary contex-
tual analysis overburdens legislative bodies, forcing them to be per-
petual monitors of their laws.5  Such arguments shirk the judicial role 
and threaten the legitimacy of both courts and legislatures.  Rational 
basis review, while more deferent, demands an examination of the 
present factual context, just like strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
Part I discusses the conventional view that the results of constitu-
tional adjudications should be permanent and attempts to reconcile 
it with contemporary contextual analysis.  Part II provides an in-depth 
discussion of contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and advocates for its use at every level of scrutiny.  Part 
II.A provides an overview of contemporary contextual analysis.  It dis-
cusses contemporary contextual analysis as a logical component of 
 
 3 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–43 (stating that the constitutional permissibility of race-
conscious admissions policies in higher education may change over time); United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (“[T]he constitutionality of a statute 
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing 
to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.”). 
 4 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“The Supreme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can trans-
form a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 
912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined defini-
tively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection analy-
sis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general matter, 
it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an equal 
protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[T]he Second Circuit has not expressly embraced the view that changed circumstances 
may be considered as part of a rational basis review.”). 
 5 Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12 & n.27; see Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111 n.3 (“In construing 
statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the circumstances at the time of pas-
sage, rather than later interpretations or statements of purpose.  Where courts have inval-
idated archaic statutes, there is often an independent constitutional basis for so doing 
(i.e., a belated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).” (citations 
omitted)). 
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the decisional rules used to implement equal protection.  Also, Part 
II.A differentiates contemporary contextual analysis from the effect of 
changed social values on constitutional interpretation.  Part II.B uses 
racial classifications under strict scrutiny to demonstrate the im-
portance of contemporary contextual analysis and its vitality in the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.  Part II.C assesses the confusion 
in the lower courts about whether contemporary contextual analysis 
should be applied in rational basis review and concludes that it must 
be applied at even the lowest level of scrutiny. 
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW:  CONSTITUTIONAL RESULTS SHOULD BE 
PERMANENT 
Laypersons, lawyers, and even judges tend to believe, or at least 
espouse the view, that the results of constitutional adjudications 
should be afforded some degree of permanence.  A statute, once 
held constitutional, must be constitutional for all time.  The underly-
ing assumption of this conventional view is that results of such an im-
portant nature cannot be changed without altering the methods by 
which judges make constitutional determinations.  The desire to con-
form to this conventional view stems from concerns for the rule of 
law and the legitimacy of the judiciary, and in particular the legitima-
cy of the Supreme Court.6 
The Court, of course, is sheltered from the normal forces of polit-
ical accountability.  Unlike the legislative and executive branches, the 
Justices harbor no fear of being removed from the bench during the 
next election cycle; no election will come to redeem an ill-advised de-
cision.  Moreover, the Court is the final arbiter of federal constitu-
tional issues.  No higher court can be called upon to overrule its 
holdings,7 and the process for amending the Constitution is so diffi-
cult that the Court’s decisions will in all likelihood survive.8 
Holding this great power of finality in “say[ing] what the law is,”9 
forces the Court to be the principal guardian of its own legitimacy.  
 
 6 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978) (“[T]he mutability 
of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, under-
mines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to 
the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation.”). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time or-
dain and establish.” (emphasis added)). 
 8 Id. at art. V (providing for a process that demands multiple supermajorities in Congress 
and the states to amend the Constitution). 
 9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
594 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
With each ruling, the Justices must consider how the public and oth-
er governmental actors will perceive their institution.  Justice Robert 
H. Jackson noted the Court’s precarious position, when he explained, 
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final.”10  While no one considers the Court infallible 
in fact, it is important for the Court to maintain the appearance of 
stability and continuity.  That stability and continuity in the judicial 
decision-making process encourages respect for the law, compliance 
with the law, and support for the judiciary as an institution. 
The doctrine of stare decisis,11 or the strong respect for precedent, 
epitomizes the Court’s efforts to preserve the rule of law and its insti-
tutional integrity.  Under its most general definition, stare decisis 
suggests that once an issue has been decided in a particular way, fu-
ture courts should resolve that same issue in the same way.12  Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey offers one of the 
Court’s most thorough discussions of stare decisis.13  In Casey, the 
Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe v. Wade14 in the face of 
tremendous public pressure to reverse course.15  Roe recognized the 
right of a woman to abort her pregnancy prior to viability.16  When 
the Court decided Casey, a persistent and vocal opposition had chal-
lenged the Roe holding for nineteen years.17  Nonetheless, the Court 
refused to overrule its previous interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause and used stare decisis to fend off the attack.18 
The Casey Court began its opinion with a general declaration in 
favor of the stability of constitutional results:  “Liberty finds no refuge 
in a jurisprudence of doubt.”19  The Court then broadly defined the 
boundaries of stare decisis, when it explained, 
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a con-
trary necessity marks its outer limit. . . . [W]e recognize that no judicial 
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case 
that raised it.  Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our 
 
 10 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 11 “Stare decisis” is the shortened form of the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, 
meaning “[t]o stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). 
 12 Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis:  Listening to Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2008). 
 13 505 U.S. 833, 854–63 (1992). 
 14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15 Casey, 505 U.S. at 868–69. 
 16 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 163. 
 17 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 844. 
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own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for 
precedent is, by definition, indispensible.  At the other extreme, a differ-
ent necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come 
to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason 
doomed.20 
Therefore, stare decisis is not an “inexorable command”; it con-
tains a component of flexibility and is guided by “prudential and 
pragmatic considerations.”21  The prudential and pragmatic inquiry 
of stare decisis requires the Court to assess (1) “whether the rule has 
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability”;22 (2) 
“whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a 
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity 
to the cost of repudiation”;23 (3) “whether related principles of law 
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine”;24 and (4) “whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old 
rule of significant application or justification.”25 
The Court’s articulation of the stare decisis inquiry supports the 
conventional view that constitutional results should be afforded a de-
gree of permanence.  In particular, the inquiry’s second question, 
whether a reliance interest would be subjected to special hardship,26 is 
bound up in the public’s perception of how the Court reaches its de-
cisions.  Those people who have relied on a previous ruling would be 
upset if the Court later reverses the decision and destroys the reliance 
interest.  In their anger, those people would also likely attribute the 
reversal to improper, political motives—motives supposedly unfit for 
officers of the judiciary. 
Yet, the fourth question of the stare decisis inquiry asks whether 
changed factual conditions have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.27  The idea of overruling a constitutional 
decision because the external facts have evolved appears to be in ten-
sion with the favorable treatment of reliance interests.  It is conceiva-
ble that people could build an intense reliance interest on a judicial 
decision even though changed facts have eroded that decision’s justi-
fication.  If judges must defer to the reliance interest, a true contem-
 
 20 Id. at 854 (citations omitted). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 855. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 854. 
 27 Id. at 855. 
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porary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause is 
doomed by stare decisis and the conventional view of constitutional 
results. 
However, the prognosis need not be so grim; stare decisis can be 
reconciled to some extent with contemporary contextual analysis.  
There are two central arguments for reconciliation.  First, one might 
argue that stare decisis is a prudential rule made by judges and does 
not itself emanate from the Constitution,28 and when stare decisis 
conflicts with contemporary contextual analysis, the demands of the 
Equal Protection Clause must override the prudential consideration.29 
While forceful, that argument sweeps too far in its willingness to 
disregard stare decisis.  There is current scholarly debate about 
whether stare decisis is itself required by the Constitution.30  To say 
that courts may not always be required to follow precedent is quite 
different from saying that courts never need to adhere to prior deci-
sions.31  At minimum, the Constitution may demand a weak form of 
stare decisis.32  Perhaps, the constitutional grounding for stare decisis 
is located in the nature of Article III “judicial power.”33  Stare decisis 
may be a feature of judicial power that distinguishes it from legislative 
power and legitimizes the process of adjudication.34  Alternatively, the 
constitutional locus of stare decisis could be the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause and the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which require equal 
 
 28 See id. at 854–55. 
 29 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as It Sounds, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005) (arguing for rejecting the doctrine of stare decisis 
when originalism and precedent conflict); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against 
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–28 (1994) (explaining that federal courts are 
obligated to search for the true meaning of the Constitution, not the meaning ascribed to 
it by Congress, the President, or even precedent); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional:  
The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that, if the 
Supreme Court wants to conform to the Constitution, it must never choose precedent 
over an examination of constitutional meaning). 
 30 See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 513 
(2000) (noting that, although some scholars thinks that stare decisis is constitutionally 
mandated, the text of the Constitution says little on the subject); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:  May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Ca-
sey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1547–48 (2000) (arguing that stare decisis is a policy judgment, 
not a requirment specified in the Constitution or implicit in its articles or structure); 
Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1308–14 (arguing, in contrast to Paulsen, that some sort of re-
spect for precedent is constitutionally required). 
 31 Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1308–12. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 1308–09. 
 34 Id. 
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treatment for similarly situated individuals.35  Without stare decisis, 
nothing prevents a court from treating two identical litigants in dif-
ferent ways.36  The first litigant could benefit from a legal rule, and 
then the court could deny that benefit to the second litigant by refus-
ing to apply the same legal rule.37  It is difficult to conceive of a more 
literal denial of equal protection of the laws.38  In reconciling the ten-
sion between stare decisis and contemporary contextual analysis, dis-
regarding stare decisis as a mere prudential rule does not offer the 
best solution.  Stare decisis may itself be rooted in the Constitution, 
and even if it is not, the doctrine is still integral to the legitimization 
of the judicial role. 
The second argument for reconciliation takes a more tempered 
approach.  Reaching a new constitutional result in a particular case 
based on contemporary contextual analysis does not necessitate over-
ruling the previous, contrary decision and implicating stare decisis.39  
Overruling or adhering to precedent is not a unitary concept.40  The 
Court’s process is not as simple as Justice Owen Roberts asserted, “to 
lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute 
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the 
former.”41 
Rather, constitutional adjudication is better understood as a three-
part process under the decisional rules model.42  First, the Court must 
decide what operative proposition of the Constitution applies.43  For 
instance, the operative proposition underlying the Equal Protection 
Clause is often stated as the government must not subject similarly 
situated individuals to different treatment without adequate justifica-
tion.44  Second, the Court must devise decisional rules to implement 
the operative proposition.45  Here, the Court has adopted three levels 
of scrutiny—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis 
review—as the decisional rules implementing the operative proposi-
 
 35 Id. at 1309–10. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 1315–19 (analyzing the Court’s modification of Roe’s tri-
mester framework in Casey). 
 40 Id. at 1319. 
 41 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). 
 42 Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 
91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–58 (2005). 
 43 Id. at 1657. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 1658. 
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tion of equal protection.46  Third, the Court must apply its decisional 
rules to the facts of concrete cases.47 
Contemporary contextual analysis occurs at the third step of con-
stitutional adjudication and does not alter the operative proposition 
or decisional rules of the Equal Protection Clause.  Because contem-
porary contextual analysis operates at the application step, overruling 
a prior decision is unnecessary for reaching a different constitutional 
result—the precedent implicated can simply be distinguished on fac-
tual grounds.  Suppose that, in 1960, the Court upheld a statute that 
banned a particular drug only because the legislature rationally be-
lieved that the drug caused cancer.  Over the next forty years, scien-
tists continued their research and developed a perfect fix for the car-
cinogenic effects.  Then, in 2000, the ban is again challenged, but the 
plaintiff presents conclusive scientific evidence that dispels any link be-
tween the drug and cancer.  The Court should strike down the ban 
because the changed factual conditions destroyed the legislature’s ra-
tional basis.  In holding that the ban is unconstitutional, the Court 
would apply the same operative proposition and decisional rule as it 
did in the 1960 case, but the opposite result would be reached.  The 
Court could reconcile the new result with stare decisis by distinguish-
ing the two cases based on the differences in the available facts at the 
time of each decision.  The Court would not need to declare that the 
1920 decision was incorrect, as the scientists’ fix for the drug did not 
then exist.48  Distinguishing prior rulings based on their facts allows 
the Court to use contemporary contextual analysis without frustrating 
the legitimation goals of stare decisis. 
Beyond the doctrine of stare decisis, Justices repeatedly conform 
their reasoning to the conventional view of constitutional results.49  
 
 46 Id. at 1676–80 (“That the tiers of scrutiny are not operative propositions but decisional 
rules is well known.”). 
 47 Id. at 1658. 
 48 This example is adapted from a similar hypothetical scenario offered by Scott H. Bice, 
which involved a food additive linked to a disease.  See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in 
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1980).  There is, however, a major distinc-
tion between the two illustrations.  Bice’s scenario states that the plaintiff showed conclu-
sive evidence that the link between the food additive and the disease never existed, rather 
than that scientists developed a perfect fix after the first court challenge.  Id. at 34.  Un-
der those circumstances, contemporary contextual analysis produces harsher results, at 
least in relation to stare decisis, because the factual premises upon which the court relied 
in its first decision did prove to be incorrect.  The changed factual conditions had noth-
ing to do with modifications to the food additive and, instead, concerned improvements 
in the ability to discern the additive’s preexisting properties. 
 49  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n my 
view the function of this Court is to preserve our society’s values regarding (among other 
things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of re-
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For example, Justice Lewis Powell’s rejection of different tiers of scru-
tiny for anti-majority and anti-minority classifications in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke shows a deep concern that the Court’s 
legitimacy will be damaged if the contents of its rulings fluctuate with 
shifts in political power.50  In Bakke, the Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids the use of pure racial or ethnic quotas in 
the admissions process of a public medical school.51  Instead, race or 
ethnicity could be considered permissibly as a “plus” factor in the in-
dividualized review of a particular applicant’s admissions file.52 
Justice Powell explained his opposition to the use of different tiers 
of scrutiny for anti-majority and anti-minority classifications, when he 
stated, 
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these 
transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional prin-
ciple, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic 
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces. . . . [T]he 
mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and 
social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of 
the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its 
coherent interpretation.53 
Powell’s statement exemplifies the conventional view in his concern 
that different generations should have a common experience with 
the Constitution.  He argued that the Court and its constitutional in-
terpretations must not appear to be swayed by fluctuations of political 
power in the same way that the legislative and executive branches 
must be swayed because they are subject to popular elections.54  His 
words give the impression that the Court should be above the un-
seemly workings of politics.55  While it is unrealistic to assume that the 
Court is not influenced by political pressure and that its Justices do 
not advance ideological positions on certain issues, a prevalent theme 
of the conventional view is that the Court and the Constitution are 
separate from the political battles dividing Americans.  The conven-
 
striction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on 
our own authority, progressively higher degrees.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 298–300 (1978) (“In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to 
discern ‘principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community 
and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the 
pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place.’” (citing ARCHIBALD COX, 
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976))). 
 50 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298–99. 
 51 Id. at 307. 
 52 Id. at 317–18. 
 53 Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
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tional view portrays the Constitution and its implementing principles 
as constant, unifying forces—anchors of stability and legitimacy. 
Though Justice Powell grounds his reasoning in the conventional 
view, he implicitly accepts the central concept behind contemporary 
contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.  The use of 
contemporary contextual analysis means that changing factual condi-
tions could lead to different constitutional results on the same issue 
even though no alteration to the controlling operative proposition or 
decisional rule occurred.  Justice Powell did not reject the idea that 
under one set of facts a classification may comply with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, while under a different set of facts that same law may 
be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. 
Instead, Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion rejected the notion that, as 
a preliminary matter, the Court should engage in a case-specific, po-
litical-power analysis to determine the controlling decisional rule.56  
Powell viewed such a political-power analysis as an imprudent exer-
cise—an attempt at simplifying and synthesizing a murky subject.57  
Powell indicated that the Court in its role as interpreter of the Consti-
tution was not the proper institution for such a task:  “Political judg-
ments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be 
weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard of justifica-
tion will remain constant.  This is as it should be, since those political 
judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by contend-
ing groups within the democratic process.”58 
The conventional view that constitutional results should be per-
manent plays an important role in the American constitutional sys-
tem.  The conventional view helps to ensure respect for the rule of 
law and the legitimacy of the unelected federal judiciary.  At first 
glance, the conventional view seems to undermine contemporary 
contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, but this initial 
assessment is mistaken.  The conventional view is focused predomi-
nately on the consistent application of operative propositions and de-
cisional rules, and contemporary contextual analysis does not inter-
fere with that focus.  To be effectuated, decisional rules must be 
applied to the facts of concrete cases.59  When factual conditions 
change, analysis under even the most stable decisional rule can yield 
a new constitutional result.  Therefore, the conventional view and 
 
 56 Id. at 299. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Id. (citations omitted). 
 59 See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1658. 
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contemporary contextual analysis can and should coexist without 
perceived judicial impropriety. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A.  An Overview 
Proper analysis under the Equal Protection Clause demands that a 
court assess classifications in light of changed factual conditions, no 
matter the level of scrutiny involved.  As discussed above, the initial 
assumption that contemporary contextual analysis cannot be squared 
with the conventional view and its judicial legitimacy goals is mistak-
en.  Not only can it be reconciled with the conventional view, but tak-
ing into account current conditions promotes the legitimacy of the 
courts and legislatures to an even greater extent.  Contemporary con-
textual analysis limits governmental power.  In its absence, classifica-
tions may become untethered from factual reality with the passage of 
time.  The duty to enforce this connection to reality falls upon the 
courts.  If the judiciary fails to maintain a system of constitutional laws 
by engaging in contemporary contextual analysis, its inaction may be 
viewed as illegitimate deference to misinformed reasoning or as sim-
ple incompetence.  Moreover, judicial neglect in ensuring that the 
law is up to date may cause the legislature to be viewed as an over-
reaching institution because its outmoded statutes place unjustified 
burdens on the public. 
To comprehend the importance of contemporary contextual 
analysis in equal protection law, a brief overview of how courts im-
plement the Equal Protection Clause is necessary.  The Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”60  While the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to 
the states, this guarantee of equal protection has been made applica-
ble to the federal government as a component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.61  Therefore, this Comment’s refer-
ences to contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause pertain to judicial review of classifications created by state 
and federal law. 
 
 60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 61 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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Proceeding under the decisional rules model, a common state-
ment of the operative proposition of the Equal Protection Clause is 
that the government cannot subject similarly situated individuals to 
different treatment without adequate justification.62  To implement 
that operative proposition the Supreme Court devised three deci-
sional rules known as the levels of scrutiny:  strict scrutiny, intermedi-
ate scrutiny, and rational basis review.63  The most demanding review, 
strict scrutiny, requires that a classification be narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling governmental interest.64  The middle level, in-
termediate scrutiny, requires that a classification be substantially re-
lated to an important governmental objective.65  Finally, the lowest 
and least-probing level, rational basis review, requires only that a clas-
sification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.66 
The level of scrutiny governing a particular case depends on 
whether the classification involved implicates certain suspect classes 
or fundamental interests.  Strict scrutiny is applied when the classifi-
cation makes distinctions based on the suspect classes of race, ethnic-
ity, national origin, and alienage.67  Strict scrutiny also governs when 
the classification affects a fundamental interest, such as voting and 
court access.68  Intermediate scrutiny is used when the classification 
makes distinctions based on the quasi-suspect classes of gender and 
illegitimacy.69  If the classification does not implicate any suspect clas-
ses or fundamental interests, rational basis review will control.70  Ra-
 
 62 Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1657. 
 63 Id. at 1676–80. 
 64 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 65 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 66 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). 
 67 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“[The Court] has held that all racial classifications imposed by 
government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 
U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (“The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on al-
ienage are ‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” (quoting Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))). 
 68 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630–33 (1969) (applying strict scru-
tiny to a classification that limited the privilege to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353, 357–58 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification that limited the availability 
of adequate appellate review). 
 69 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification 
based on illegitimacy); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“To withstand constitutional challenge, 
previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
 70 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10 (“[T]his Court’s cases are clear that, unless a classification war-
rants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental 
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protec-
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tional basis review is the predominant level of scrutiny for economic 
and social legislation.71  The Court applies rational basis review to a 
vast range of classifications, including classifications based on wealth, 
age, and disability.72 
Despite the differences among these levels of scrutiny, they all 
share a common element—each level of scrutiny demands that a 
court examine the factual context of the classification.  A court can-
not determine whether a state interest is compelling, important, or 
legitimate without looking to the circumstances surrounding that in-
terest.  Furthermore, a court cannot determine whether a classifica-
tion is narrowly tailored, substantially related, or rationally related 
without examining the facts that create the supposed relationship be-
tween the classification and the interest.  When using strict or inter-
mediate scrutiny, a court may also need to assess the facts demon-
strating potential alternatives to the classification. 
This connection between factual context and review under the 
Equal Protection Clause is significant because facts change over time.  
A classification that once satisfied the requirements of equal protec-
tion could later become unconstitutional merely because the factual 
conditions changed.73  For example, under strict scrutiny, a previously 
approved classification could become unconstitutional because the 
compelling interest no longer exists74 or because a new alternative to 
the classification destroyed its narrow tailoring.75 
 
tion Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state inter-
est.”). 
 71 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is 
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by 
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  When social or economic leg-
islation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the 
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the 
democratic processes.”(citations omitted)). 
 72 Id. at 442 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on mental disability); 
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (applying rational basis 
review to a classification based on old age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1973) (concluding that wealth is not a suspect class and applying ra-
tional basis review). 
 73 Developments in the way facts are perceived or discovering new information about old 
facts could also have an effect.  See generally Angelo N. Ancheta, Science and Constitutional 
Fact Finding in Equal Protection Analysis, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (2008) (discussing the histo-
ry of scientific data in the factual analyses of the Supreme Court and arguing for expand-
ed use). 
 74 Heightened national security risk in wartime is a fleeting compelling interest that dissi-
pates with the threats of war.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944) 
(“Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden 
is always heavier.  Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, ex-
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Yet, some courts have failed to recognize the significance of 
changed factual conditions in their equal protection analyses.76  In-
stead, these courts look only to the facts that existed at the time of 
the classification’s creation.77  This problem arises commonly when 
courts are conducting the most deferent form of inquiry under the 
Equal Protection Clause—rational basis review.78  No matter the level 
of scrutiny involved, analyzing a classification under the factual con-
ditions of its creation, rather than the current factual conditions, is 
not supported by the Supreme Court’s precedent and undermines 
the constitutional restraints placed on legislative power.79 
Before exploring contemporary contextual analysis more fully, it 
must be distinguished from overruling prior constitutional results 
based on changed social values.  A change in social values can occur 
without a corresponding change in the factual conditions surround-
ing a constitutional issue.80  For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the 
Court declared unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment a Texas statute that criminalized same-sex 
sodomy because it infringed on the liberty of consenting adults to 
engage in “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, . . . in 
the most private of places, the home.”81  Lawrence explicitly overruled 
the Court’s prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,82 which had upheld a 
 
cept under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic 
governmental institutions.”). 
 75 While diversity in higher education might remain a compelling interest, the advent of 
race-neutral means for achieving that diversity would destroy the narrow tailoring of ra-
cial preferences in the college admissions process.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
341–43 (2003). 
 76 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“The Supreme Court has remained ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can 
transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 
898, 912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined de-
finitively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection 
analysis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general 
matter, it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an 
equal protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–27 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Second Circuit has not invalidated a statute as irrational based on 
changed circumstances.”). 
 77 Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12; Lerner, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 682; 
Jones, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425–27. 
 78 Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1110–11; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 910–13; Lerner, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 
682; Jones, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425–27. 
 79 See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 80 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986). 
 81 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578. 
 82 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. 
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similar Georgia anti-sodomy statute.83  In reaching its conclusion, the 
Lawrence Court relied on the “emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”84  The Court referenced a 
number of authorities from the United States and Europe to support 
its insistence that the values on which Bowers relied no longer provid-
ed an adequate justification to place a criminal constraint on this lib-
erty.85 
The Lawrence Court’s decision to overrule Bowers did not result 
from changed factual conditions; it was the product of changed social 
values.  Between 1986 and 2003, consenting homosexual adults did 
not alter their sexual conduct, and the definition of sodomy re-
mained constant.  What did develop over those intervening years was 
a broader social acceptance of the homosexual community and more 
liberal attitudes toward sexuality in general. 
That scenario falls outside of the realm of pure contemporary 
contextual analysis.  Contemporary contextual analysis, as discussed 
here, is concerned solely with changes in the hard facts needed to 
prove the importance of a governmental interest and the relationship 
between that interest and the classification.  The previously offered 
hypothetical involving a banned drug demonstrates that contempo-
rary contextual analysis is most effective when focused on tangible 
facts, rather than public perceptions, which are intangible and often 
difficult to divine.86  While there may exist some form of contempo-
rary contextual analysis that considers changed social values, the em-
pirical complexities of defining social values and the question of 
whether current social values even ought to influence constitutional 
interpretation places that issue well beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. 
B.  Contemporary Contextual Analysis in Strict Scrutiny:  A Brief Study of 
Racial Classifications 
The Supreme Court has followed contemporary contextual analy-
sis consistently when reviewing racial classifications under strict scru-
 
 83 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not cor-
rect today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and 
now is overruled.”). 
 84 Id. at 572 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. at 572–78 (“To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it 
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected else-
where.”). 
 86 See supra Part I. 
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tiny.  The Court’s exacting review of racial classifications highlights 
two central features of contemporary contextual analysis:  (1) the of-
ten transient nature of governmental interests and (2) the potential 
of new factual conditions to break down the relationship between 
classifications and governmental interests.  First, the Court’s analysis 
of the restrictions imposed on people of Japanese descent during 
World War II demonstrates an emergency governmental interest that 
dissipated once peace was achieved.87  Second, the Court’s expecta-
tion that racial preferences in higher education will reach a “logical 
end point” illustrates that changed factual conditions, such as the de-
velopment of race-neutral alternatives, could deprive such prefer-
ences of their narrowly tailored relationship to the governmental in-
terest of diversity.88 
During World War II, the United States imposed many restrictions 
on the liberty of people of Japanese ancestry, including curfews, ex-
clusion from their homes, and ultimately internment.89  The power to 
install those restrictions derived from President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9066, issued on February 19, 1942.90  
Executive Order No. 9066 authorized the Secretary of War and des-
ignated Military Commanders to prescribe “military areas” from 
which “any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to 
which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be 
subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropri-
ate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.”91  Roosevelt 
granted the military those sweeping powers to provide “every possible 
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-
defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense 
utilities.”92 
On February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War designated Lt. Gen-
eral John L. DeWitt as Military Commander of the Western Defense 
Command.93  In March 1942, through a series of public proclama-
 
 87 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943). 
 88 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–43 (2003). 
 89 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89–90.  See generally Dean Masaru 
Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States:  A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996) (discussing the legal burdens imposed on Japanese people 
in the United States during World War II and the ongoing legacy of the Court’s decisions 
regarding those burdens). 
 90 Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 74–75. 
 91 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 86. 
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tions, DeWitt established a military area for the Pacific Coast region 
that encompassed the entire states of Arizona, California, Oregon, 
and Washington.94  On March 21, 1942, Congress ratified Executive 
Order No. 9066, and subsequent military proclamations, by passing 
legislation that criminalized violations of the military orders.95  Under 
its expanded authority, the military curtailed the liberty of Japanese 
people living within the military areas, and in the end, it relocated 
approximately 120,000 people, including 70,000 American citizens, to 
internment camps.96 
The military’s actions precipitated several challenges for the 
Court, perhaps the most well known of which were Hirabayashi v. 
United States97 and Korematsu v. United States.98  As a preliminary matter, 
three common misconceptions about those cases must be dispelled.  
First, neither case considered directly the constitutionality of the now 
infamous internment program.  Hirabayashi involved a challenge to a 
curfew imposed on Japanese people in the military areas,99 while Ko-
rematsu concerned the constitutionality of an order excluding that 
same group from their homes.100 
Second, though it is often said that strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause originated in Hirabayashi and Korematsu,101 neither 
case contained an equal protection challenge.102  In Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, the Court decided only that the curfew and exclusion or-
der did not constitute impermissible delegations of legislative power, 
exceed Congress’s war powers, or deny due process under the Fifth 
Amendment.103  The Court did not even impose the requirements of 
equal protection on the federal government until a decade after it 
decided Hirabayashi and Korematsu.104 
 
 94 Id. at 87. 
 95 Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942); Hashimoto, supra note 89, 
at 75. 
 96 Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 75. 
 97 320 U.S. at 81. 
 98 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 99 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83. 
100 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221–23. 
101 The most notable examples of the Court citing Korematsu to support its application of 
strict scrutiny are Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).  See Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 87–89 & n.124 (discuss-
ing the frequent use of Korematsu to support the application of strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications). 
102 Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88–89. 
103 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–18; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83, 91–93, 100. 
104 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954); Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88. 
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Third, regardless of the Court’s language, it did not subject the 
racial classifications in Hirabayashi and Korematsu to “the most rigid 
scrutiny.”105  Instead, the Court applied rational basis review.106  The 
Court showed extreme deference to the government’s articulated in-
terest and raised no concerns about narrow tailoring.107 
Notwithstanding the deep and recognized flaws of Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, those cases illustrate an important feature of contempo-
rary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection Clause—the tran-
sient nature of governmental interests.  Though the Court in Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu only considered the discriminatory nature of 
the military’s orders under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, that analysis, while certainly more deferent, is similar to mod-
ern equal protection analysis and offers useful insights about the ef-
fect of extreme emergencies on the permissibility of racial classifica-
tions.108 
In Hirabayashi, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a curfew 
that required “all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in [a military] 
area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of 
8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.”109  The Court began its description of the 
government’s interest by discussing the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.110  The Court observed that the extensive damage to the larg-
est American naval base in the Pacific, and the nation’s last line of de-
fense, placed the West Coast in serious danger of air raids and inva-
sion by Japanese forces.111  The prevention of espionage and sabotage 
in the threatened area aided the government’s efforts to defend 
against any potential Japanese offensive.112 
The Hirabayashi petitioner, who had been convicted of violating 
the curfew, did not contest the severity of the wartime threat or ap-
propriateness of a curfew in thwarting espionage and sabotage, activi-
 
105 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216, 218; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102; Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 
88; Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 381–82 (2006). 
106 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (“Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, ‘we cannot reject as unfounded 
the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress . . . .’” (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted)); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102 (“In this case it is enough that circumstances 
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the na-
tional defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.” (emphasis add-
ed)); Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88; Siegel, supra note 105, at 382. 
107 Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 88; Siegel, supra note 105, at 382. 
108 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–20; Hirabayshi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
109 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83. 
110 Id. at 93–94. 
111 Id. at 94. 
112 Id. at 94–95. 
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ties most often conducted in “the hours of darkness.”113  Rather, the 
petitioner contended that the application of the curfew to all people 
of Japanese descent constituted a denial of due process.114 
The Court prefaced its analysis of that racial classification by stat-
ing, “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are 
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality.  For that reason, legislative 
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been 
held to be a denial of equal protection.”115  But considerations of 
equality did not prevail in the Court’s final conclusion.116  The Court 
noted that the vast majority of Japanese people living in the United 
States resided within the military area on the Pacific Coast.117  Fur-
thermore, the Court refused to “reject as unfounded the judg-
ment . . . that there were disloyal members of that population, whose 
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascer-
tained.”118  The Court then invoked the special circumstances of war 
to support the government’s use of a racial distinction:  “[T]he dan-
ger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened inva-
sion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant 
fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.” 119  In 
holding that the curfew’s application to all people of Japanese ances-
try did not deny due process, the Court reasoned that “[t]he fact 
alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than 
another enemy power set these citizens apart from others who have 
no particular associations with Japan.”120 
In Korematsu, the Court returned to its reasoning in the Hira-
bayashi decision but placed greater emphasis on the wartime emer-
gency.121  The Korematsu petitioner argued that a military order, which 
excluded all people of Japanese ancestry from their homes in the 
West Coast military area, resulted in an unconstitutional denial of 
due process.122  Again, the Court began its discussion by explaining 
the general presumption against racial classifications: 
 
113 Id. at 99. 
114 Id. at 100. 
115 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
116 Id. at 100–01. 
117 Id. at 96. 
118 Id. at 99. 
119 Id. at 100. 
120 Id. at 101. 
121 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1944). 
122 Id. at 215–16. 
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It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is 
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public ne-
cessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an-
tagonism never can.123 
Nevertheless, the Court found that, even under “the most rigid scru-
tiny,” the difficulties of war permitted the exclusion order.124 
The Court explained that the reason for the temporary exclusion 
of Japanese people rested on the same ground as the curfew—the 
prevention of espionage and sabotage in vulnerable areas.125  It then 
stated that investigations made subsequent to exclusion confirmed 
the disloyalty of certain members of the Japanese population.126  In 
concluding that the exclusion order complied with the demands of 
due process, the Court highlighted the government’s vital interest in 
the successful prosecution of war and the intense, yet temporary, 
burdens citizens must bear: 
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.  All 
citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in great-
er or lesser measure.  Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privi-
leges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier.  Compulsory ex-
clusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under 
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our 
basic governmental institutions.  But when under conditions of modern 
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect 
must be commensurate with the threatened danger.127 
For the purposes of contemporary contextual analysis, Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu demonstrate the fleeting nature of governmental in-
terests.  In its opinions, the Court placed great emphasis on the seri-
ous danger presented by World War II and the government’s need to 
take swift action in securing the national defense.128  Given that em-
phasis on the government’s wartime interest, it is highly doubtful that 
the Court would have permitted similar racial classifications in a time 
of peace or the continuation of such classifications long after the 
 
123 Id. at 216. 
124 Id. at 216, 218–20. 
125 Id. at 217–19. 
126 Id. at 219.  To support its claims about the disloyal elements of the Japanese population, 
the Court referenced reports that approximately five thousand American citizens of Jap-
anese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and that sev-
eral thousand evacuees requested repatriation to Japan.  Id.  This evidence failed to ac-
count for resentment toward the United States engendered by the exclusion order and 
internment.  Hashimoto, supra note 89, at 81. 
127 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20. 
128 Id. at 218–20; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S 81, 100 (1943). 
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war’s end.  Governmental interests, like a successful war effort, that 
are both extreme and transient illustrate how contemporary contex-
tual analysis may produce different constitutional results without ma-
nipulating the applicable decisional rule.  When a racial classification 
is created in response to a particular emergency and that emergency 
ceases, the constitutionality of the classification must cease as well.  
Here, contemporary contextual analysis is acting as a restraint on 
government power.  If a court looked only to the facts that existed 
when the government established an emergency racial classification, 
the constitutionality of that classification could persist indefinitely.  
As the supporting emergency dissipates, such an unchecked classifi-
cation will transform from a necessity to invidious discrimination. 
Recognizing that a governmental interest may break down over 
time addresses only the first half of strict scrutiny and equal protec-
tion analysis more generally.  To understand fully the importance of 
contemporary contextual analysis, the logical relationship between 
the classification and the interest it is supposed to further must be 
examined.  Under strict scrutiny, this logical relationship is ensured 
through narrow tailoring.129  Similar to a transient governmental in-
terest, changed factual conditions can also cause the narrow tailoring 
of a classification to be lost. 
Grutter v. Bollinger provides a prominent example of the Court’s 
endorsement of contemporary contextual analysis in assessing wheth-
er a racial classification is narrowly tailored.130  In Grutter, the Court 
concluded that the race-conscious admissions process of the Universi-
ty of Michigan Law School, a public institution, complied with the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause.131  At the start of its strict 
scrutiny analysis, the Court found that the law school possessed a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.132  The Court 
explained that diversity in higher education promotes racial under-
standing, improves learning outcomes, prepares students for the 
modern workplace, and opens the paths of leadership to a wider 
range of people.133  Next, the Court determined that the law school’s 
use of race as a single factor in an individualized, holistic review of 
each applicant was narrowly tailored to further the compelling inter-
est of diversity.134  This narrow tailoring rested largely on the law 
 
129 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
130 Id. at 341–43. 
131 Id. at 343. 
132 Id. at 329. 
133 Id. at 329–33. 
134 Id. at 337. 
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school’s “serious, good faith consideration” of potential race-neutral 
alternatives and the finding that those alternatives were unworka-
ble.135 
Having decided that the law school’s admissions process passed 
strict scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor closed the Court’s opin-
ion by stating that such racial preferences “must be limited in time.”136  
Justice O’Connor explained that race-conscious admissions processes 
are not exempt from “the requirement that all governmental use of 
race must have a logical end point.”137  That “logical end point” will 
be found through “periodic reviews to determine whether racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”138  
The development of effective race-neutral alternatives or continuing 
increases in the number of minority applicants attaining higher 
grades and test scores might undermine the racial classification’s nar-
row tailoring.139  She then finished with what is now known as the sun-
set provision for affirmative action in higher education:  “We expect 
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.”140 
The Grutter Court’s discussion of a “logical end point” for racial 
classifications and the sunset provision are explicit endorsements of 
contemporary contextual analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause.141  The expectation that racial preferences will not be needed 
by 2028 should not be construed as a strict time limit on the use of 
affirmative action.142  Instead, it is better characterized as a statement 
of the Court’s intention to continually reassess the factual conditions 
on which Grutter’s narrow-tailoring inquiry relied.  Subsequent 
changes to the factual conditions could undermine the narrow tailor-
ing of race-conscious admissions in a number of ways.  For example, 
improved grades and test scores among minority applications could 
enable schools to achieve diversity without offering racial prefer-
 
135 Id. at 339–40. 
136 Id. at 342. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 342–43. 
140 Id. at 343. 
141 Id. at 342–43. 
142 Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation:  The Legitimacy of Durational 
Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 104 (2006) (“Grutter reflected an expectation that 
race-conscious admissions will be unnecessary by 2028 rather than a holding or a mere 
hope to that effect.”).  But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Court will not even deign to make the Law School try other 
methods, however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to violate the Constitu-
tion.”). 
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ences, or a workable race-neutral alternative could be developed.  
Those potential changes may lead the Court to conclude that race-
conscious admissions no longer pass constitutional muster.  Here, 
Grutter demonstrates the significance of contemporary contextual 
analysis when testing the relationship between a racial classification 
and the interest it is meant to further.  While diversity in higher edu-
cation will likely remain a compelling interest, racial preferences may 
someday be an overly burdensome method for promoting that inter-
est. 
The foregoing cases demonstrate the Court’s consistent use of 
contemporary contextual analysis under strict scrutiny.  Through that 
analysis, the Court examines both the facts supporting governmental 
interests and the facts establishing a relationship between classifica-
tions and interests.  While strict scrutiny provides extreme examples, 
it is not unique among the levels of scrutiny in containing a contex-
tual component.  Each level of scrutiny requires an assessment of the 
factual context at the time of the constitutional challenge.  The les-
sons learned from the application of strict scrutiny must be carried 
through to the more deferent forms of review. 
C.  Contemporary Contextual Analysis in Rational Basis Review 
The acceptance of contemporary contextual analysis in strict scru-
tiny should be explicitly extended to rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Rational basis review, which requires that a 
classification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental inter-
est, contains the same contextual component as strict scrutiny.  To 
determine whether a governmental interest is legitimate or whether a 
classification bears a rational relationship to a particular interest, a 
court must examine the factual conditions at the time of the constitu-
tional challenge.  The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence 
indicates that rational basis review demands this assessment of the 
current facts.  Moreover, contemporary contextual analysis in rational 
basis review restrains government power and legitimizes the actions 
of courts and legislatures. 
While the logical structures of strict scrutiny and rational basis re-
view share a contextual component, these levels of scrutiny diverge in 
their assessments of legislative purpose.  A compelling interest under 
strict scrutiny requires that the asserted interest have been the legisla-
ture’s actual purpose for the classification.143  That actual purpose 
 
143 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (1996). 
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must also be supported by strong evidence.144  In contrast, a legitimate 
interest under rational basis review requires only that the asserted in-
terest be a conceivable purpose for the classification.145  The legisla-
tive record need not evidence any consideration of the conceivable 
purpose; whether that conceivable purpose actually motivated the 
legislature is irrelevant.146  That divergence creates a slight difference 
between applying contemporary contextual analysis in strict scrutiny 
and applying such analysis in rational basis review. 
The focus on actual purpose in strict scrutiny causes contempo-
rary contextual analysis to act as a greater restriction on legislative 
power.  Once changed factual conditions eliminate a classification’s 
compelling interest, no new compelling interest, which arose after 
the changed facts, can be substituted to support the classification.  
That substitute compelling interest could not have been the actual 
purpose for the classification because a legislature cannot consider 
factual conditions of which it is not yet aware.  A court reviewing a 
classification supported only by a newly substituted compelling inter-
est would be forced to strike down that classification under strict scru-
tiny.  This result comports with the purposes of strict scrutiny.  Strict 
scrutiny is invoked to review classifications implicating suspect classes 
and fundamental interests—subject matters that present the greatest 
potential for invidious discrimination.147  A legislature should not be 
able to justify such dubious classifications with compelling interests 
that it never contemplated. 
While the interplay between actual purpose and contemporary 
contextual analysis means that new compelling interests cannot 
emerge after a classification’s creation, it does not prevent a legisla-
ture from establishing a classification based on multiple compelling 
interests, each supported by the requisite actual purpose.  If changed 
factual conditions undermine one or more of a classification’s com-
pelling interests, the classification can still survive strict scrutiny pro-
vided that at least one of its compelling interests remains valid under 
the new facts and that compelling interest was an actual purpose of 
the legislature when it created the classification. 
The restrictiveness of requiring actual purpose in strict scrutiny 
offers a stark contrast to the flexibility granted by the combination of 
conceivable purpose and contemporary contextual analysis in ration-
al basis review.  Though contemporary contextual analysis in rational 
 
144 Id. 
145 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993). 
146 Id. at 315. 
147 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
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basis review allows for the uncommon situation in which changed fac-
tual conditions eliminate a legitimate interest, contemporary contex-
tual analysis also permits substitute legitimate interests to arise from 
those changed facts.  In rational basis review, a legislature can take 
advantage of substitute legitimate interests because a conceivable 
purpose does not require that the legislature have actually considered 
the interest in establishing the classification.  This relaxed stance on 
substitute legitimate interests is consistent with the flexible and def-
erent nature of rational basis review.  Rational basis review applies to 
all classifications that do not implicate suspect or quasi-suspect classes 
and fundamental interests, and such classifications are unlikely to be 
devised for invidious discrimination.148 
Therefore, in both strict scrutiny and rational basis review, con-
temporary contextual analysis, when coupled with the corresponding 
model of legislative purpose, accentuates the underlying nature of 
each level of scrutiny.  First, strict scrutiny becomes more restrictive 
because a legislature cannot justify its classifications with substitute 
compelling interests that it could not have considered.  Second, ra-
tional basis review becomes more flexible because a legislature can 
take advantage of substitute legitimate interests that arise under 
changed factual conditions. 
Having examined some aspects of how contemporary contextual 
analysis operates in rational basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause, it is vital to evaluate the precedential and theoretical support 
for using contemporary contextual analysis at the lowest level of scru-
tiny.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is filled with a long history 
of contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review under 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Some of the Court’s most revered jurists recognized that once-
rational laws could be rendered irrational under new and unforeseen 
facts.  In 1924, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., endorsed contem-
porary contextual analysis by acknowledging that legislative predic-
tions of future facts are sometimes flawed: 
But even as to [declarations of the legislature,] a Court is not at liberty to 
shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends 
upon the truth of what is declared.  And still more obviously so far as this 
declaration looks to the future it can be no more than prophecy and is li-
able to be controlled by events.  A law depending upon the existence of 
an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to op-
 
148 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
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erate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when 
passed.149 
Then, in 1931, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes followed the same 
reasoning, when he explained, “a police regulation, although valid 
when made, may become, by reason of later events, arbitrary and 
confiscatory in operation.”150  In 1935, Justice Louis D. Brandeis also 
supported contemporary contextual analysis:  “A statute valid as to 
one set of facts may be invalid as to another.  A statute valid when en-
acted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is 
applied.”151 
Though contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review 
holds a prominent position in the Court’s case law, some misleading 
authority does exist in the equal protection field.  In 1911, the 
Court’s opinion in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. directed the fo-
cus of rational basis review towards the facts at the time of a classifica-
tion’s creation.152  The Court stated, “When the classification in such a 
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the 
time the law was enacted must be assumed.”153  Rather than disputing 
the propriety contemporary contextual analysis, this language is more 
concerned with expressing the higher degree of deference required 
by rational basis review.  There is no indication that the Lindsley 
Court had reason to consider changed factual conditions. 
Even so, United States v. Carolene Products Co.154 and Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co.155 have created the most confusion in the low-
er courts about whether contemporary contextual analysis should be 
applied in rational basis review.156  Carolene Products provides a strong 
statement in favor of examining the current factual conditions in ra-
tional basis review.157  The Court explained that “the constitutionality 
 
149 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924) (citations omitted). 
150 Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765, 772 (1931); see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (“It is always open to judicial inquiry 
whether the exigency still exists upon which the continued operation of the law de-
pends.”). 
151 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (footnote omitted). 
152 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
153 Id. 
154 304 U.S. 104 (1938). 
155 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
156 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. 
Supp. 2d. 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–26 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
157 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153. 
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of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts 
may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have 
ceased to exist.”158  But Carolene Products also contains a more general 
discussion of the deference afforded to the legislature in rational ba-
sis review, unrelated to the specific point on contemporary contextu-
al analysis: 
But by their very nature such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is 
drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of 
facts either known or which could be assumed affords support for it.  
Here the demurrer challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it 
is evident from all the considerations presented to Congress, and those of 
which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable 
. . . .159 
Subsequent references to this “at least debatable” language have cre-
ated uncertainty about whether contemporary contextual analysis 
operates in rational basis review.160 
In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court quoted the deferential language 
of Carolene Products and made it appear as though courts should al-
ways look back to the time of the classification’s creation.161  The 
Court stated, 
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection 
Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, 
they cannot prevail so long as “it is evident from all the considerations 
presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial 
notice, that the question is at least debatable.”  Where there was evidence 
before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, litigants 
may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evi-
dence in court that the legislature was mistaken.162 
But resolving questionable issues at the time of passage in favor of the 
legislature’s determination is distinct from considering changed fac-
tual conditions that occur subsequent to passage.  The Court empha-
sized that the legislature held evidence “reasonably supporting the 
classification,” and the case did not present the issue of whether new 
facts showed that the initial evidence was now irrelevant.163 
With this intense focus on judicial deference to legislative deci-
sions, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have identified the 
use of contemporary contextual analysis in rational basis review as an 
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 154 (emphasis added). 
160 See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153–54) (cita-
tions omitted). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153–54) (citations omitted). 
163 Id. 
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unresolved issue.164  The Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit raised the 
question explicitly.165  Those courts argued that contemporary contex-
tual analysis overburdens legislative bodies and is beyond the institu-
tional competence of the judiciary.166 
In Murillo v. Bambrick, the plaintiffs brought a class action alleging 
that a New Jersey statute and court rule that assessed higher fees in 
matrimonial actions than in other civil actions violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.167  According to the challenged provisions, matrimo-
nial actions, even if uncontested, could not be listed for trial until the 
plaintiff paid an additional fifty-dollar fee.168  If the matrimonial ac-
tion was contested, the provision required the plaintiff to submit an-
other ten-dollar payment to cover the cost of stenographic services.169 
These fees originated as a mechanism to finance the use of special 
masters in resolving matrimonial actions prior to the adoption of no-
fault divorce.170  In 1948, the New Jersey legislature abolished the use 
of special masters in such proceedings, but collection of the fees per-
sisted because the duties of the former special masters then needed 
to be performed by trial judges.171  However, in 1971, the legislature 
 
164 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“The Supreme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstances can trans-
form a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 
912 n.27 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have determined defini-
tively whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration in equal protection analy-
sis.”); Lerner v. Corbett, 972 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“As a general manner, 
it is unclear whether consideration of changed circumstances is appropriate to an equal 
protection inquiry.”); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425–26 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not expressly embraced the view that changed circum-
stances may be considered as part of a rational basis review.”). 
   Several state supreme courts have explicitly recognized contemporary contextual 
analysis when conducting rational basis review under the equal protection clauses of their 
respective state constitutions.  See, e.g., Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 
913 (Fla. 2014) (“Conditions can change, which remove or negate the justification for a 
law, transforming what may have once been reasonable into arbitrary and irrational legis-
lation.”); Ferdon ex rel. Pertucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 468 (Wis. 
2005) (“A statute may be constitutionally valid when enacted but may become constitu-
tionally invalid because of changes in the conditions to which the statute applies.  A past 
crisis does not forever render a law valid.”  (footnotes omitted)).  This Comment does 
engage in an in-depth discussion of the foregoing state court authority because those de-
cisions did not implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Addition-
ally, while those state courts did accept contemporary contextual analysis, they did not 
engage in a more elaborate discussion of its benefits. 
165 Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111; Murillo, 681 F.2d at 912. 
166 Murillo, 681 F.2d at 911–12; see Burlington, 763 F.2d at 1111. 
167 Murillo, 681 F.2d at 900. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 906–07. 
171 Id. at 907. 
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established the no-fault divorce, eliminating the requirement that a 
plaintiff prove a marital wrong.172  Despite the no-fault reforms, the 
legislature made no corresponding change to the additional fees lev-
ied on matrimonial actions.173 
The Murillo plaintiffs argued that the collection of the special fees 
for matrimonial actions lost its rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest after the adoption of no-fault divorce.174  They 
asserted that, following this reform, the legislature could not rational-
ly believe that divorce proceedings would continue to exert a greater 
burden on the judicial system than other civil actions.175 
The Third Circuit disagreed with this argument and held that the 
special fees passed rational basis review even after the establishment 
of no-fault divorce.176  The court identified two potential rational ba-
ses relating the fees to the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining its 
judiciary.177  First, the legislature could rationally believe that divorce-
related litigation would continue to impose an additional financial 
burden on the courts.178  Second, the legislature could rationally be-
lieve that the increasing costs of civil litigation as a whole justified the 
recovery of additional funds and that matrimonial actions offered an 
appropriate starting point because litigants already expected to pay 
special fees.179  The court concluded that, under rational basis review, 
the legislature held no duty to support its beliefs with empirical evi-
dence.180 
The Third Circuit’s conclusions concerning the rationality of the 
special fees present no threat to contemporary contextual analysis.  
In fact, those conclusions fit quite comfortably within the deferent 
nature of rational basis review. 
However, the court continued its discussion and questioned 
whether it was appropriate to consider changed factual conditions.  
The Third Circuit noted, “[T]he Supreme Court appears not to have 
determined definitively whether changed conditions are a relevant 




174 Id. at 907–08. 
175 Id. 




180 Id. at 909–10. 
181 Id. at 912 n.27 (identifying the conflicting statements in Clover Leaf Creamery and Carolene 
Products). 
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ed that considering changed conditions “impose[s] an unwarranted 
obligation upon legislative bodies:  the obligation constantly to reas-
sess the continuing validity of the factual premises underlying each 
piece of legislation enacted over the years.”182  The court explained 
that the Constitution “neither demands nor expects” legislatures to 
exercise “omniscient oversight” once its laws take effect.183  Finally, 
the court reasoned that it should only strike down a rationally enact-
ed classification “when a statute, rendered manifestly unreasonable 
by changed conditions, remains in effect for many years without legis-
lative action.”184 
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Department of Public Service Regula-
tion, the Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of changed factual condi-
tions and responded with the same concerns as the Murillo court.185  
There, the plaintiff, a railroad company, challenged a Montana stat-
ute and regulation that required railroads to maintain and staff sta-
tion facilities in towns with a population of at least 1000 people.186  
Moreover, Montana law did not impose similar demands on other 
common carriers.187  The plaintiff argued that changed conditions 
rendered this requirement irrational under the Equal Protection 
Clause.188  In the sixteen years since the statute’s 1969 enactment, 
centralized, computerized service centers took over many of the du-
ties performed by station agents.189  Also, freight traffic from the small 
stations declined significantly in that same time period.190 
The Ninth Circuit first identified the legislature’s legitimate gov-
ernmental interest as serving “the public convenience and necessi-
ty.”191  The court then concluded that the legislature could rationally 
believe that railroads are a special class of common carrier, providing 
a vital form of transportation, and that requiring station facilities in 
small communities would ensure a minimal level of service for the 
state’s citizens.192  Even considering the plaintiff’s evidence that the 
railroad industry had undergone substantial changes, the court found 
 
182 Id. at 911. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 912. 
185 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1985). 
186 Id. at 1108–09. 
187 Id. at 1113. 
188 Id. at 1111, 1113–14. 
189 Id. at 1109. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1109–10. 
192 Id. at 1110, 1113–14. 
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that those changes were not so drastic as to transform the legislature’s 
assumptions from rational to irrational.193 
Similar to the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Murillo, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s basic conclusions under rational basis review do not conflict 
with contemporary contextual analysis.  The Ninth Circuit did con-
sider the plaintiff’s evidence of changed factual conditions, but that 
evidence failed to demonstrate that requiring station facilities in 
small towns had become irrational.194 
Even so, the Ninth Circuit voiced its concerns about assessing clas-
sifications based on changed conditions.  The court stated, “The Su-
preme Court has been ambivalent on whether changed circumstanc-
es can transform a once-rational statute into an irrational law.”195  The 
court then explained that the time of the classification’s creation is 
the proper point of reference in rational basis review: 
In construing statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the 
circumstances at the time of passage, rather than later interpretations or 
statements of purpose.  Where courts have invalidated archaic statutes, 
there is often an independent constitutional basis for doing so (i.e., a be-
lated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).196 
The Murillo and Burlington courts’ dismissals of contemporary 
contextual analysis rely on common arguments about the institution-
al competence of the legislature and judiciary, but such dismissals are 
unwarranted.  The argument that contemporary contextual analysis 
will place an extreme burden on legislative bodies assumes that the 
duty to maintain a system of constitutional laws—laws not based on 
outmoded factual premises—falls almost entirely to legislatures.  Of 
course, people who believe that a particular law has become irration-
al should complain to their legislative representatives.  Because those 
representatives are politically accountable, the legislature may re-
spond to the people’s concerns.  But attempting to update the law 
through the legislative process is a complex and time-consuming en-
deavor.197  Even if claims that a law has become irrational are merito-
rious, the legislature may view the problem as too insignificant to jus-
tify taking corrective action.198  Business that the legislature considers 
more important may also stifle such a remedy.199 
 
193 Id. at 1111. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 1111 n.3 (citations omitted). 
197 See Bice, supra note 48, at 35–36. 
198 Id. at 36. 
199 Id. 
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In light of the legislature’s limited responsiveness, courts provide 
the best forum to evaluate the continuing rationality of laws.  First, 
people may not realize that a particular classification applies to them 
until an enforcement action is brought before a court, precluding 
their ability to lobby the legislature for a change.200  Second, courts 
are skilled empirical fact-finders.  The judiciary’s broad discovery 
tools allow it to gain access to a vast amount of relevant infor-
mation,201 and the adversarial process ensures the zealous presenta-
tion of arguments on each side. 
If courts refuse to consider changed factual conditions, analyzing 
the rationality of classifications only at the time of creation, they will 
rarely find that classifications are based on implausible assumptions 
unless the legislature made a “clear mistake.”202  This focus on the 
point of creation turns the already deferent rational basis review into 
a toothless inquiry.  The judiciary’s failure to conduct a meaningful 
assessment of the constitutionality of classifications threatens its own 
legitimacy and the legitimacy of legislative bodies. 
When courts review classifications for their rational bases, they are 
asking whether the state’s actions adhere to the minimum require-
ments of the Constitution.  Rational basis review often validates even 
those classifications that are unwise or improvident on the assump-
tion that the political process will rectify them, but there is an im-
portant distinction between classifications that are merely unwise and 
classifications that are unconstitutional.203  Though unwise classifica-
tions may be politically unpopular, a legislature is empowered to cre-
ate them.  On the other hand, a legislature lacks any power to create 
unconstitutional classifications.  By allowing classifications that are ir-
rational in the current factual context to remain in effect, courts ab-
dicate their role as monitors of constitutional compliance.  The pub-
lic may then question the legitimacy or competence of a judiciary that 
permits the power of the legislature to swell beyond its constitutional 
bounds. 
 
200 Id. at 35–36. 
201 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37 (outlining the information-gathering tools available in the dis-
covery process). 
202 See Bice, supra note 48, at 35. 
203 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes that, absent 
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by 
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter 
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.  Thus, we will not overturn a 
statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the 
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that 
the legislature’s actions were irrational.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Additionally, the courts’ neglect of contemporary contextual anal-
ysis could foster resentment of the legislature.  If burdened by classi-
fications that make no rational sense in the present context, the pub-
lic may direct its disdain for those classifications toward their creator.  
The legislature might be viewed as an unrestrained institution, ex-
panding its own power without check. 
The Supreme Court should clarify that contemporary contextual 
analysis is a necessary part of rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The Court’s precedent supports the conclusion 
that previously rational classifications can become irrational as factual 
conditions change.  Also, the judiciary holds the proper tools and ex-
perience to examine the changed factual conditions, and by conduct-
ing such examinations, it promotes the stability and visibility of con-
stitutional restraints on government power. 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary contextual analysis is an integral part of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Each level of scrutiny requires that courts exam-
ine the factual conditions surrounding a classification at the time of 
the constitutional challenge, rather than the time of the classifica-
tion’s creation.  Though contemporary contextual analysis may lead 
to once-constitutional laws later being declared unconstitutional, it 
can be reconciled with the conventional view that constitutional deci-
sions are permanent because no manipulation of operative proposi-
tions or decisional rules is necessary.                                                                      
 While the Supreme Court has used contemporary contextual 
analysis consistently in strict scrutiny, lower courts debate the ap-
plicability of such analysis in rational basis review.  This debate must 
be resolved in favor of contemporary contextual analysis.  First, the 
Court’s precedent indicates that the rationality of laws can be affect-
ed by subsequent facts.  Second, courts possess the tools and experi-
ence to engage in complex empirical fact-finding.  Third, contempo-
rary contextual analysis promotes the legitimacy of the judiciary and 
other government institutions. 
 
